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Abstract. The so-called great divergence in the income per capita is described in the 
Unified Growth Theory as the mind-boggling and unresolved mystery about the growth 
process. This mystery has now been solved: the great divergence never happened. It was 
created by the manipulation of data. Economic growth in various regions is at different 
levels of development but it follows similar, non-divergent trajectories. Unified Growth 
Theory is shown yet again to be incorrect and scientifically unacceptable. It promotes 
incorrect and even potentially dangerous concepts. The distorted presentation of data 
supporting the concept of the great divergence shows that economic growth is now 
developing along moderately-increasing trajectories but mathematical analysis of the same 
data and even their undistorted presentation shows that these trajectories are now 
increasing approximately vertically with time. So, while the distorted presentation of data 
used in the Unified Growth Theory and the spuriously-created great divergence suggest the 
generally sustainable and secure economic growth, the undistorted presentation of data 
demonstrates that the growth is unsustainable and insecure. Similar dangerously incorrect 
concept promoted by the Unified Growth Theory is the repeated doctrine of takeoffs from 
the hypothetical but non-existent stagnation to growth. They also suggest prosperous and 
secure future. Such takeoffs never happened but even without them the current economic 
growth is insecure.  
Keywords. Economic growth, Unified Growth Theory, Regional economic growth, Great 
Divergence, Income per capita, Hyperbolic growth 
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1. Introduction 
hose who are less familiar with the scientific process of investigation might 
not be aware that there is also unscientific approach, which unfortunately 
appears to be used sometimes even in academic circles. It is important to 
have a clear understanding of these two different ways of investigation in order to 
be able to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable claims and 
conclusions. 
In science, theories are tested by data. In unscientific discussions, data are tested 
by theories. In unscientific presentations, selective use of data is common. Data are 
manipulated, distorted or rejected if they do not agree with preconceived ideas.  
In the scientific research, contradicting evidence is not only accepted but looked 
for because it usually leads to new discoveries. In unscientific discussions, 
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contradicting evidence is studiously rejected because it threatens the established 
knowledge.  
In science, data are rigorously analysed. In non-scientific discussions, rigorous 
analysis is avoided and interpretations of data are based on impressions, but 
impressions can be misleading and even great thinkers can make a mistake. ―It is 
clear that the earth does not move, and that it does not lie elsewhere than at the 
centre‖ (Aristotle). Appearances and logical explanations are not necessarily 
reliable. ―Plato is my friend, Aristotle is my friend, but my greatest friend is truth‖ 
(Sir Isaak Newton). 
It is also important to understand the limitations of mathematics. Elaborate 
stories and explanations can be translated into mathematical language but such 
translations are meaningless unless they can be tested by data.  
We should never be mesmerised by complicated mathematical formulae and 
presentations. The essential question is whether the presented mathematics can be 
tested by relevant data. If stories translated into mathematics cannot be tested by 
data, if they have to be accepted by faith, then obviously they have no scientific 
value and they can be ignored or even rejected. Mathematical formulations should 
be making testable predictions. A story dressed up in a mathematical gown will be 
just a story unless it makes a testable prediction.  
A good example of the unscientific approach to research is the Unified Growth 
Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011). Data are manipulated and distorted. Selected data, 
which appear to support preconceived concepts, are repeatedly quoted. Excellent 
data of Maddison (2001) are used during the formulation of this theory but they are 
never analysed. They are presented in distorted ways to support preconceived 
ideas. Galor translates his assumed and scientifically-unsupported interpretations of 
economic growth into many complicated but rather primitive mathematical 
formulae. However, he does not make even a single mathematical prediction, 
which can be tested directly by data. His mathematical expressions do not describe 
growth trajectories that could be compared with data, even with data he uses during 
the formulation of his theory. Ironically, precisely the same data, when analysed, 
are in direct contradiction of his theory. 
His concepts can be only tested indirectly by showing that within the range of 
the mathematically-analysable data there was no stagnation, no sudden takeoffs, no 
―remarkable‖ or ―stunning‖ escapes from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 
177, 220) and no transition from stagnation to the so called sustained growth 
regime (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 
2015h). Economic growth in the past was sustainable and secure, as indicated by 
the steadily-increasing hyperbolic trajectories, but now it is unsustainable and 
insecure (Nielsen, 2015b). The numerous mathematical formulae used in the 
Unified Growth Theory do not describe or explain the historical economic growth 
because they incorporate concepts, which are either contradicted repeatedly by data 
or have to be accepted by faith. 
We have already demonstrated (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a, 2016d; 2016e; 
2016f; 2016g; 2016h) that Galor‘s Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally 
incorrect because it is based on fundamentally-incorrect ideas. We have shown that 
within the range of the mathematically-analysable data, historical economic growth 
and the growth of population were hyperbolic. For the economic growth, the range 
of evidence is limited but for the growth of human population it can be extended to 
10,000 BC (Nielsen, 2016b). We have demonstrated that within the range of 
analysable data, there was no Malthusian stagnation and no Malthusian trap in 
economic growth and in the growth of population. The growth was slow over a 
long time but it was steadily increasing and there was no transition at any time in 
the past that could be described as a sudden takeoff, spurt, sprint or explosion. We 
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have demonstrated that Galor‘s claim of sudden takeoffs is repeatedly contradicted 
by data. There were no takeoffs and consequently there was also no differential 
timing of takeoffs. During the time of the claimed takeoffs, economic growth and 
the growth of population were either continuing to increase along undisturbed and 
remarkably stable hyperbolic trajectories or they were diverted to slower 
trajectories. This conclusion applies not only to the growth of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and population but also to the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap). We do not have to try to explain the mechanism of the epoch of 
Malthusian stagnation and of the escape from the Malthusian trap because there 
was no stagnation and no trap in the economic growth and in the growth of 
population. What we have to explain is why the growth in the past was hyperbolic, 
why it was so remarkably stable and why it started to be diverted recently to new, 
non-hyperbolic trajectories. 
 
2. The concept of the great divergence 
The concept of the great divergence belongs to a set of other phantom 
―mysteries about the growth process‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) invented by Galor and 
reinforced by the habitually distorted presentations of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 
2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 
Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). One example of such distorted 
presentation of data used routinely by Galor is shown in Figure 1. In contrast, the 
accurate presentation of precisely the same data, together with their mathematical 
analysis, is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1.Example of the ubiquitous, grossly-distorted and self-misleading diagrams used to 
create the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011). Maddison’s data (Maddison, 
2001) were used during the formulation of this theory but they were never analysed. Such 
state-of-the-art was used to construct a system of scientifically-unsupported interpretations, 
explanations and “mysteries of the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220). 
 
In the distorted and appropriately manipulated presentation of data shown in 
Figure 1 we can see clearly the non-monotonic growth of population and of the 
GDP/cap. After the apparent long stagnation, we see a sudden takeoff to a new 
regime of growth. Galor made no attempt to analyse data, which is surprising 
because their analysis is trivially simple (Nielsen, 2014). The manipulated data 
appear to support the concept of stagnation and takeoffs described usually as the 
escape from the Malthusian trap. 
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In contrast, the accurate display of precisely the same data suggests entirely 
different interpretation. General features presented in Figure 1 are still maintained 
but now mathematical analysis of these data shows that the GDP/cap and the size of 
the population were increasing monotonically (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016d; 
2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2016h).There were no sudden takeoffs from stagnation to 
growth because there was no stagnation and because the acceleration was gradual 
along the entire range of these distributions. The gradient and the growth rate of the 
GDP/cap distribution were changing monotonically without any discontinuity, 
which could be claimed as a takeoff (Nielsen, 2015a, 2016a, 2016h). 
 
Figure 2. Precisely the same data (Maddison, 2001) as used in Figure 1but now displayed 
accurately and analysed. They follow monotonically-increasing distributions, which cannot 
be divided into distinctively-different components (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2016a, 2016d, 
2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h). 
 
Even though the GDP/cap distribution seems to suggest a sudden increase, this 
feature is just an illusion, which is dispelled by the mathematical analysis of data or 
even by using semi logarithmic scales of reference (Nielsen, 2015a, 2016g). The 
GDP/cap is the ratio of two distributions, the distribution describing the growth of 
the GDP and the distribution describing the growth of population. Both were 
increasing hyperbolically and monotonically (Nielsen, 2015a, 2016a, 2016d). The 
displayed features (slow growth over a long time and fast growth over a short time) 
represent nothing more than mathematical properties of monotonically-increasing 
hyperbolic distributions. They are not the unique properties of economic growth but 
economic growth happens to be hyperbolic. 
It is impossible to locate a transition from the slow to fast growth for hyperbolic 
distributions (Nielsen, 2014) because such a transition does not exist. The GDP/cap 
distributions are simply the linearly-modulated and monotonically-increasing 
hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2015a).  
The distorted diagram used by Galor to support his erroneous concept of the 
great divergence is presented in Figure 3.  This distorted presentation of 
Maddison‘s data was reproduced from Galor‘s publication (Galor, 2005a, p. 175). 
It shows that over a long time there was hardly any difference in the economic 
growth for various regions. However, from around the time of the Industrial 
Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994), there was a sudden takeoff 
and the economic growth diverged into distinctly different trajectories.  
We have already demonstrated that there were no takeoffs in the growth of the 
GDP and GDP/cap (Nielsen, 2015a, 2016a, 2016e, 2016g) and consequently there 
was also no differential timing of takeoffs claimed by Galor in his Unified Growth 
Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). We have also demonstrated that there were no 
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takeoffs in the growth of the world population in the past 12,000 years (Nielsen, 
2016b) and in the growth of regional populations (Nielsen, 2016d). The 
incorrectly-claimed takeoffs by Galor represent just the natural continuations of 
hyperbolic growth. Analysis of data shows that at the time of the alleged takeoffs, 
and in clear contradiction of the Unified Growth Theory, economic growth in 
various regions was either continuing to increase along undisturbed hyperbolic 
trajectories or started to be diverted to slower trajectories. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A typical distorted presentation of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) used by 
Galor to support his concepts of takeoffs and of the great divergence (Galor, 2005a, p. 
175). 
 
Now we shall show that there was no great divergence in the income per capita. 
We shall show again that the Unified Growth Theory is scientifically unacceptable. 
It does not describe the mechanism of economic growth. It describes phantom 
features constructed by the manipulation of data.  
We shall show that the great divergence never happened. However, we shall 
also explain how Galor constructed his great divergence. We shall show how the 
great divergence can be constructed by a distorted presentation of any distributions, 
which increase slowly over a long time and fast over a short time. They do not 
have to be distributions describing economic growth.  
 
3. Analysis of the early data of Maddison 
We shall first investigate precisely the same data (Maddison, 2001) as used by 
Galor (2005a; 2011) during the formulation of his Unified Growth Theory and we 
shall show that they do not support the concept of the great divergence. Results of 
mathematical analysis of these data are shown in Figures 4-9. Parameters of the 
fitted distributions have been listed earlier (Nielsen, 2016g). The fitted curves are 
the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2015a) obtained by 
dividing hyperbolic distributions fitting the corresponding GDP and population 
data (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016d). All GDP/cap values are in 1990 International Geary-
Khamis dollars. 
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Figure 4. Growth of income per capita, i.e. Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP/cap), 
in Western Europe (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 2016g). From around 1913, economic 
growth in Western Europe started to depart from the historical linearly-modulated 
hyperbolic distribution. However, it continued to increase close to the historically-
predicted trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 5. Growth of income per capita in Eastern Europe (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 
2016g). From around 1870, economic growth in Eastern Europe started to depart from the 
historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continued to increase 
close to the historically-predicted trajectory. The growth was not diverted to a distinctly 
different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a; 2011;cf Figure 3). 
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Figure 6. Growth of income per capita in countries of the former USSR (Maddison, 2001; 
Nielsen, 2016g). From around 1870, economic growth in the former USSR started to depart 
from the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continued to 
increase close to the historically-predicted trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 7. Growth of income per capita in Asia (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 2016g). The data 
follow closely the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. There was no divergence to a 
distinctly different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a; 2011;cf 
Figure 3). 
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Figure 8. Growth of income per capita in Africa (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 2016g). The 
data follow closely the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions. There was no 
divergence to a distinctly different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor 
(2005a; 2011;cf Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 9. Growth of income per capita in Latin America (Maddison, 2001; Nielsen, 
2016g). From around 1913, economic growth in Latin America started to depart from the 
historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continued to increase 
close to the historically-predicted trajectory. The growth was not diverted to a distinctly 
different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a; 2011, cf Figure 3). 
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Figure 10. Growth of income per capita in all regions, including Western offshoots 
(Maddison, 2001). They are all increasing in approximately the same direction. There is no 
divergence to distinctly different trajectories. 
 
The data for Western Offshoots were not analysed because of their poor quality, 
but they are displayed in Figure 10. Their economic growth is similar to the growth 
in Western Europe in the sense that they are clearly ahead of other regions. 
However, distributions presented in Figures 4-9 show that economic growth in all 
regions follows similar trajectories. The difference between regions is not in their 
divergence to distinctly different trajectories as claimed incorrectly by Galor but in 
their levels of economic development.    
Distributions presented in Figures 4-9 are clearly different than the distorted 
distributions constructed by Galor and presented in Figure 3. In Galor‘s distorted 
presentation of data there is a cluster of regions (Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and 
Latin America) whose economic growth follows distinctly different trajectories 
than the growth in Western Europe. This information is incorrect because the 
analysis of precisely the same data shows clearly that all distributions are similar, 
including the distribution representing the economic growth in Africa. They are all 
following similar trajectories with a common tendency to increase nearly vertically 
and close to the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic trajectories. 
The common characteristic feature of all these empirical distributions shown in 
Figures 4-9 is that they have changed gradually from being nearly horizontal to 
nearly vertical. We shall show later that when such distributions become nearly 
vertical it is easy to distort them and construct the great divergence, and it does not 
matter whether they follow the fitted linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions or 
not.  
The contrast between Maddison‘s data and their distorted image constructed by 
Galor is particularly clear if we compare Figure 3 with Figure 8. In Figure 3, the 
data for Africa follow a gently-increasing trajectory after around 1800, i.e. a 
trajectory characterised by a small gradient. The correct display of the same data 
presented in Figure 8 shows diametrically opposite features: the data for Africa 
follow a steep trajectory, i.e. the trajectory characterised by a large gradient. This 
trajectory is approximately vertical.  
In Galor‘s distorted presentation of data the trajectory for Africa after around 
1800 is distinctly different than the trajectory for Western Europe. However, 
precisely the same data displayed in Figures 4 and 8 demonstrate that the 
trajectories for Africa and Western Europe are similar. The only difference is that 
Africa is further behind in its level of development. 
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In Galor‘s distorted presentation of data, economic growth in Eastern Europe, 
Asia and Latin America follows also gently increasing trajectories after around 
1800, similar to the trajectory for Africa. However, precisely the same data 
displayed properly in Figures 5, 7, 8 and 9 show that they all follow approximately 
vertical trajectories in much the same way as the data for Western Europe. The 
only difference is again that Western Europe is further ahead but it is further ahead 
on the virtually the same trajectory.  
With such distorted presentation of data, it is not surprising that Galor 
discovered so many ―mind-boggling‖ and ―perplexing‖―mysteries of the growth 
process‖ (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220), mysteries representing phantom features 
created by the manipulation of data. 
In contrast with his distorted presentation of data, the gradient of all empirical 
trajectories in this section of time is large. They all increase approximately 
vertically. Such a growth cannot be explained by claiming that larger size of 
population demands larger GDP. What we have here is the increasing GDP per 
person. It is a growth that reflects our surprisingly fast-increasing demands. 
Galor‘s theory conveys dangerously incorrect information. According to his 
distorted presentation of data shown in Figure 3, income per capita in certain 
regions (Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America) is following gently 
increasing trajectories after around 1800. Such trajectories are relatively safe. 
However, the correct presentation of precisely the same data shows that in all 
regions income per capita is following the dangerously fast-increasing trajectories. 
The data show that there is now a critical urgency to regulate economic growth but 
Galor‘s theory suggests that there is no danger. 
According to his erroneous theory, after a long epoch of stagnation we have 
escaped the tyranny of the Malthusian trap and now we can enjoy the sustained 
growth regime. Furthermore, according to his erroneous concept of the great 
divergence, economic growth in most regions diverged to the generally safe 
trajectories. However, according to the precisely the same data, all regions are now 
following dangerously fast-increasing trajectories and for all of them, without 
exception, economic crisis seems to be strongly probable.    
 
4. Analysis of the latest data of Maddison 
Data published by Maddison in 2010 show even more clearly that there was no 
divergence in the economic growth. These data were available to Galor before the 
publications of his book (Galor, 2011) but unfortunately they were not analysed. 
Had Galor analysed these data he would have soon discovered many interesting 
features characterising economic growth, features, which are repeatedly in 
contradiction with his Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011).   
Results of analysis of these new data (Maddison, 2010) are shown in Figures 
11-16. Their combined display is presented in Figure 17.  
The mystery of Galor‘s ―mind-boggling‖ and ―perplexing phenomenon of the 
Great Divergence‖ (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) has now been solved – there is no 
mystery. This mystery and all other of his mysteries were created by the 
manipulation of data. In Galor‘s publications (2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 
2010; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008) data 
are repeatedly manipulated and presented using distorted diagrams.  
The common characteristic feature of Maddison‘s data describing the growth of 
income per capita (Maddison, 2001; 2010) in various regions is again that their 
nearly horizontal trajectories changed gradually into nearly vertical trajectories. 
They have never diverged into distinctly different trajectories as claimed by Galor 
(see Figure 3).  
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Economic growth in all regions is now following new trajectories but all of 
them continue to increase close to the historical, linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
trajectories, which escape to infinity at a fixed time. In contrast with Galor‘s 
interpretation based on his erroneous concept of the great divergence, all new 
trajectories are critically fast. They do not increase to infinity at a fixed time but 
they pose virtually the same danger as the historical, linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
trajectories because they are close to the trajectories, which increase to infinity at a 
fixed time.   
 
Figure 11. Growth of income per capita in Western Europe (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 
2016g). Between 1900 and 1913, economic growth in Western Europe started to depart 
from the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continues to 
increase close to the historically-predicted trajectory. 
 
Figure 12. Growth of income per capita in Eastern Europe (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 
2016g). From around 1850 economic growth in Eastern Europe started to depart from the 
historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it continues to increase 
close to the historically-predicted trajectory. The growth was not diverted to a distinctly 
different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a; 2011;cf Figure 3). 
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Figure 13. Growth of income per capita in countries of the former USSR (Maddison, 2010; 
Nielsen, 2016g). Close to around 1870 economic growth in countries of the former USSR 
started to depart from the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. However, it 
continues to increase close to the historically-predicted trajectory. 
 
Figure 14. Growth of income per capita in Asia (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 2016g). After a 
brief decline between 1940 and 1950, the growth of income per capita in Asia was diverted 
to a slightly faster trajectory. However, it continues to increase close to the historically-
predicted linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. The growth was not diverted to a 
distinctly different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by Galor (2005a; 2011;cf 
Figure 3). 
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Figure 15. Growth of income per capita in Africa (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 2016g). In 
clear contradiction of Galor’s claim supported by his distorted presentation of Maddison’s 
data, the growth of income per capita did not diverge to a slowly-increasing trajectory but 
continues to increase along a nearly vertical trend close to the historical linearly-modulated 
hyperbolic distribution (cf Figure 3). 
 
Figure 16. Growth of income per capita in Latin America (Maddison, 2010; Nielsen, 
2016g). In clear contradiction of Galor’s claim supported by his distorted presentation of 
Maddison’s data, growth of income per capita continued to increase along a nearly vertical 
trajectory close to the historical linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. The growth 
was not diverted to a distinctly different and gently-increasing trajectory as claimed by 
Galor (2005a; 2011;cf Figure 3). 
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Figure 17. Growth of income per capita in all regions, including Western offshoots 
(Maddison, 2010). Even without carrying out mathematical analysis of data it is clear that 
they all follow similar, nearly-vertical trajectories. The mystery of the “mind-boggling” and 
“perplexing phenomenon of the Great Divergence” (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) has now 
been explained – there is no mystery. The great divergence never happened. This mystery, 
as well as all his other “unresolved mysteries about the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 
220) have been created by the mind-boggling, perplexing and self-misleading manipulation 
of data. 
 
In Galor‘s distorted presentation of data shown in Figure 3, economic growth in 
various regions follows similar trajectories for a long time and then diverges to 
distinctly different trajectories. In the correct and undistorted presentation of data 
shown in Figure 17, economic growth in various regions follows similar 
trajectories all the time. Some regions are slower in their economic development 
but they all race in the same direction and along virtually the same trajectory. They 
do not fan out into distinctly different directions as claimed by Galor. 
We do not have to explain the mechanism of the great divergence because the 
great divergence never happened. It is a feature created by the distorted 
presentation of data. If we want to explain the currently observed differences in the 
economic growth we should not be misguided by the Unified Growth Theory and 
we should not attempt to explain why different regions follow distinctly different 
trajectories, because they do not follow distinctly different trajectories. We should 
rather try to explain why different regions follow similar trajectories and why for 
some regions economic growth is faster while for other regions it is slower. 
 
5. Geometric distortions 
We shall now explain how Galor constructed his ―unresolved mysteries about 
the growth process‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 220): (1) his ―mind-boggling‖ and 
―perplexing phenomenon of the Great Divergence‖ (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) 
and (2) his equally mind-boggling but fictitious takeoffs from the alleged but non-
existent stagnation to growth. To demonstrate how such mysteries are created, we 
can take any close family of distributions, which change slowly over a large range 
of independent variable and fast over its short range. We can use hyperbolic 
distributions, linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions, a set of empirical 
distributions such as shown in Figures 10 and 17, or any other hyperbolic-like 
distributions. By their simple manipulation we can easily create Galor‘s ―mysteries 
about the growth process‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) but they will not be unresolved 
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mysteries. They will not even be mysteries because we shall demonstrate and 
explain their origin. We shall demonstrate that these alleged mysteries do not 
represent unique properties of economic growth but the introduced by us 
disfigurations of hyperbolic-like distributions.  
For our demonstration we have chosen three, closely-related linearly-modulated 
hyperbolic distributions shown in Figure 18. Like the historical income per capita 
distributions, each of these arbitrary distributions is represented by a ratio of two 
hyperbolic distributions. However, they have absolutely nothing to do with 
economic growth. They are purely mathematical functions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x
where x is an arbitrary independent variable. This variable could be time but it 
could be also anything else. The common feature of these distributions is that they 
start from approximately the same value at 0x  , they increase monotonically 
(they are not characterised by sudden takeoffs at any time) and they increase to 
infinity within a small range of x values. They do not diverge.  
 
 
Figure 18. Three arbitrarily-chosen, linearly-modulated, hyperbolic distributions, ( )f x , 
( )g x  and ( )h x . They increase monotonically from approximately the same value at 0x 
to infinity within approximately the same time. They do not diverge.  
 
However, if we follow Galor‘s example we can use these non-divergent and 
monotonically-increasing distributions and construct a new set of diverging 
distributions, which will be also characterised by clear takeoffs. All we have to do 
is to select a few strategically-located points at certain constant x-values and join 
them by straight lines. This is precisely what Galor was doing repeatedly during the 
formulation of his Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) and in his other 
publications (Galor, 2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2012a; 2012b; 
2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). 
We have selected three values of independent variable, 0x  ,  150x   and  
179.6x  , and by following Galor‘s example, we have connected the 
corresponding values of  ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x by straight lines. We have now 
constructed typical distributions used by Galor to formulate his Unified Growth 
Theory. We have also constructed the great divergence and the takeoffs. Results 
are shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. This figure explains how the “mind-boggling” and “perplexing phenomenon of 
the Great Divergence” (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) was invented by Galor and how he 
created his otherwise non-existing takeoffs from the non-existing stagnation to growth. By 
following his approach to research, the corresponding values of the purely-mathematical 
functions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x at 0x  ,  150x   and  179.6x  were joined by 
straight lines. The monotonically-increasing distributions are now replaced by distorted 
diagrams in much the same way as Maddison’s data were replaced by Galor by his 
distorted diagrams. We have constructed the meaningless “mind-boggling” and 
“perplexing phenomenon of the Great Divergence” (Galor, 2005a,pp. 177, 220) preceded 
by the equally meaningless takeoffs at 150x  . 
 
It would be incorrect to claim that our constructed distributions shown in Figure 
19 represent the original distributions, which were shown in Figure 18, but Galor 
repeatedly and incorrectly uses his distorted diagrams as representing Maddison‘s 
data. His repeatedly used diagrams are the misrepresentations of data and his 
conclusions based on such diagrams or on quoting some isolated numbers selected 
from hyperbolic distributions are scientifically unacceptable and strongly 
misleading. 
By using the constructed great divergence and the takeoffs shown in Figure 19 
and by constructing more of such diagrams we could now create a unified growth 
theory describing properties of the distorted diagrams and insist that they represent 
mathematical properties of ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x functions or the properties of 
other similar distributions. However, it would be naive for us to expect that people 
familiar with mathematics would be impressed by our scholarly performance and 
by the mysteries we have created. It would be naïve to expect that they would 
accept our explanations of the claimed mathematical properties of hyperbolic-like 
distributions, and yet Galor expects that economists will accept his distorted 
representations of Maddison‘s data and his explanations of economic growth based 
on such repeatedly distorted presentations of data reinforced by the numerous 
quotations of well-selected and isolated numbers, which are supposed to represent 
a reliable empirical confirmation of his theory.  
Like Galor, we could claim the existence of takeoffs from stagnation to growth 
for our mathematical, monotonically-increasing functions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x . 
We could try to explain these phantom takeoffs by some fanciful mechanisms, but 
such explanations would be unacceptable because the original functions increase 
monotonically. They are not characterised by sudden takeoffs. These takeoffs do 
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not exist. We have created them by distorting the original functions in much the 
same way as Galor created them by distorting Maddison‘s data. 
Like Galor, we could also claim the existence of the great divergence and try to 
explain it by some complicated mechanisms but again our claim and our 
explanations would be unacceptable because the original functions do not diverge. 
We have created the great divergence, which does not characterise the original 
functions but only their distorted representations. Like Galor, we could claim the 
existence of the ―unresolved mysteries‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) about mathematical 
functions but the only audience we could hope to impress would be people who are 
not familiar with mathematics but it is also possible that even people unfamiliar 
with mathematics would soon notice that what we are doing is just clever or maybe 
even not so clever sophism.  
Conclusions based on the distorted representations of mathematical 
distributions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x can be obviously rejected. Likewise, conclusions 
based on Galor‘s distorted representations of Maddison‘s data can be and even 
should be rejected. Galor presents many curious and seemingly logical stories 
about economic growth but his stories are either repeatedly contradicted by data 
(Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2015h) or have 
no convincing confirmation in data. They have to be accepted largely by faith. 
Stories of fiction can be also attractive, logical and convincing but they will remain 
stories of fiction. 
It would be incorrect to claim that the distorted diagrams presented in Figure 19 
represent the mathematical distributions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x . Likewise, it would 
be incorrect to claim that the distorted diagrams used repeatedly by Galor in his 
Unified Growth Theory and in his other publications represent Maddison‘s data.  
It would be incorrect to claim that the distorted diagrams presented in Figure 19 
describe the mathematical functions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x . Likewise, it would be 
incorrect to claim that the distorted diagrams presented by Galor in his Unified 
Growth Theory and in his many other publications describe economic growth. 
They describe the world of fiction.  
It could be hardly expected that explanations of the properties of mathematical 
functions ( )f x , ( )g x  and ( )h x based on their distorted representations shown in 
Figure 19 could be ever accepted by people familiar with mathematics. Likewise, it 
can be hardly expected that explanations of economic growth based on such 
distorted presentations of data as used by Galor in his Unified Growth Theory and 
in his other publications canbe accepted by the scientific community. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
We have analysed Maddison‘s data (Maddison, 2001; 2010) and we have 
demonstrated that the great divergence claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011) and shown 
in Figure 3 never happened. Various regions are now on different levels of 
development but their economic growth did not diverge into distinctly different 
trajectories as claimed by Galor (see Figure 3). Their income per capita increases 
along similar, approximately vertical trajectories.  
The disagreement between Galor‘s claim and the data can be demonstrated 
using the early Maddison‘s data (Maddison, 2001), which Galor used in their 
habitually distorted presentations during the formulation of his Unified Growth 
Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2010). However, the disagreement between his claims and 
the data becomes even more pronounced if we display the latest data of Maddison 
(2010), which were available to Galor before the publication of his book (Galor, 
2011).  
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The data do not even have to be analysed mathematically to show that they 
contradict Galor‘s claim of the existence of the great divergence but their 
mathematical analysis is helpful. Galor‘s claims expressed in his Unified Growth 
Theory and in his other similar publications are based on his failure to adhere to the 
fundamental and indispensable principles of scientific investigation, which require 
that data should be rigorously analysed, that conclusions should not be based on 
impressions and that data should not be manipulated to support preconceived ideas. 
His theory, his claims and his interpretations are scientifically unacceptable. 
―The mind-boggling phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita 
across regions of the world in the past two centuries, that accompanied the take-off 
from an epoch of stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth, presents 
additional unresolved mysteries about the growth process‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 220). 
It is interesting how a single sentence can contain so much misinformation. 
His mysteries have now been solved: he has created them by the manipulation 
of data.  
The great divergence never happened and neither did the takeoffs from 
Malthusian stagnation to growth (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 
2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2015h). Within the range of analysable data there was 
no stagnation and no transition from stagnation to growth. Features described by 
Galor as takeoffs are not takeoffs but the natural continuations of monotonically-
increasing hyperbolic distributions describing the growth of the GDP or 
population, or the natural continuations of monotonically-increasing linearly-
modulated distributions describing the growth of the GDP/cap. Hyperbolic 
distributions or linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions are slow over a long 
time and fast over a short time but they do not change suddenly from slow to fast at 
any time. They increase monotonically all the time. 
Hyperbolic growth excludes the interpretations revolving around the concept of 
Malthusian stagnation and around takeoffs from stagnation to growth described 
usually as the escape from the Malthusian trap. The evidence contradicting such 
interpretations is overwhelming. It is remarkable that so many independent studies 
are in such perfect agreement: Maddison‘s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) and their 
analysis (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2015h); the 
estimates of the size of human population not only during the AD era but also 
during the BC era (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1967, 1974, 
1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994) and their analysis (e.g. Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 
2016b; Kapitza, 2006); the discovery made by von Foerster, Mora & Amiot (1960) 
and similar identifications of hyperbolic growth by Podlazov (2002), Shklovskii 
(1962; 2002) and von Hoerner (1975). 
According to Galor, the ―differential timing of the take-off from stagnation to 
growth across countries, and the corresponding variations in the timing of the 
demographic transition, led to a great divergence in income per capita as well as 
population growth‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 218). This is a good example how fiction can 
be created even in science. Non-existent takeoffs have been constructed by 
distorted presentations of data. These non-existent takeoffs were then used to 
explain the non-existent differential timing of takeoffs, and now the same phantom 
takeoffs are used to explain the origin of the non-existent great divergence 
constructed by the manipulation of data.  
Galor wonders about ―the underlying driving forces that triggered the recent 
transition between these regimes and the associated phenomenon of the Great 
Divergence in income per capita across countries‖ (Galor, 2005a, pp. 174, 219). 
While it is interesting to study reasons for differences in the level of economic 
growth of various regions and countries, there is no need to wonder about the 
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underlying driving forces of the great divergence because the great divergence 
never happened. 
Galor claims that ―In the course of the ‗Great Divergence‘ the ratio of GDP per 
capita between the richest region and the poorest region has widened considerably 
from a modest 3 : 1 ratio in 1820, to a 5 : 1 ratio in 1870, a 9 : 1 ratio in 1913, a 15 
: 1 ratio in 1950, and a 18 : 1 ratio in 2001.‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 174). All these ratios 
are probably correct but the conclusion is incorrect because there was no great 
divergence. Economic growth in various regions is on different levels of 
development but it follows the virtually the same, non-diverging, trajectories.  
This is a good example of being guided by impressions and of using them to 
draw hasty conclusions. Data have to be rigorously analysed. Using isolated 
numbers, as done repeatedly by Galor, is likely to lead to incorrect interpretations 
particularly if such a use of isolated numbers is combined with the repeatedly 
distorted presentation of data, such as shown in Figures1 and 3. Taking shortcuts 
and using them to draw hasty conclusions based usually on preconceived ideas and 
on wished-for interpretations does not represent scientific process of investigation. 
The ratios listed by Galor do not prove the existence of the great divergence. We 
have already demonstrated that the great divergence never happened. The listed 
ratios represent nothing more than hyperbolic growth and different levels of 
development along virtually identical trajectories. 
Current economic growth in various regions and countries is at different levels 
of development. For countries characterised by high human development, income 
per capita can be as high as tens of thousands of dollars but for countries 
characterised by low human development it can be about one hundred times lower 
(Nielsen, 2006). However, Maddison‘s data show that economic growth in all 
regions, without exception, is developing along virtually the same trajectories. 
Galor‘s interpretation of economic growth is potentially dangerous because it 
creates a false sense of security. He shows that gradients of the current economic-
growth trajectories are in general small and consequently the imminent economic 
crisis is unlikely (see Figure 3).  
However, data convey totally different information. Economic growth in all 
regions is now increasing rapidly along virtually vertical trajectories (see Figures 
4-17). They resemble the historical linearly-modulated trajectories, which increase 
to infinity at a fixed time. For such trajectories, economic crisis can be expected 
because the growth has to be supported by excessively large per annum increase in 
the GDP per capita. The created stress can be too high to be manageable over a 
long time. There is also a danger of reaching quickly natural limits to growth. 
Warning signs can be already seen in Eastern Europe, in countries of the former 
USSR and in Africa (Figures 12, 13, 15). Their growth of income per capita 
suffered reversals but after a certain time it managed to recover and follow again 
the nearly vertical trajectories. Certain degree of instability can be also observed in 
Latin America (Figure 16). 
The preferred option would be to follow now gently-increasing trajectories but 
all regions, without exception, appear to be caught up in the general frenzy to 
increase rapidly their per capita economic growth. When they are temporarily left 
behind they soon resume their hazardous race. Current trajectories do not increase 
to infinity at a fixed time but they increase to infinity in a short time, which is 
hardly a consolation. 
All these important warning signs are not even noticed in the Unified Growth 
Theory. Unified Growth Theory appears to suggest a prosperous future after an 
ages-long epoch of a hypothetical stagnation but the data show that the future of 
economic growth is approaching rapidly levels of unsustainability. It has been 
shown that the world economic growth follows unsustainable trajectory (Nielsen, 
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2015b). However, the analysis of Maddison‘s data presented here suggests that this 
is a common danger shared by all regions. There is not a single region, whose 
economic growth diverged to a safer trajectory. 
The two opposite interpretations of economic growth have also essential impact 
on research activities. In order to explain Galor‘s great divergence we would have 
to explain why there was a transition to distinctly different trajectories of economic 
growth. Such attempts would be a waste financial and human resources and a waste 
of time because the great divergence never happened. What we have to explain is 
why different regions follow virtually the same trajectories and why they follow 
such potentially-hazardous, fast-increasing trajectories. Why there is such a strong 
desire to increase the GDP per capita so quickly everywhere and how to control 
these dangerous tendencies.  
Galor claims that the ―transitions from a Malthusian epoch to a state of 
sustained economic growth and the emergence of the Great Divergence have 
shaped the current growth process in the world economy‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 221). 
They did not because there was no ―emergence of the Great Divergence.‖ Galor 
describes phantom features he created by his manipulation of data. These phantom 
features could not have shaped the past growth and they do not shape the current 
growth because they did not and do not exist. Galor describes the world of fiction 
and events that never happened. He then uses these non-existing phenomena to 
weave his theory around them. 
Transitions from the Malthusian epoch of stagnation to a state of sustained 
economic growth never happened because there was no stagnation. Economic 
growth was sustained in the past because it followed steadily-increasing hyperbolic 
trajectories. Takeoffs, which are supposed to represent the claimed transitions from 
stagnation to growth, never happened (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 
2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2015h).  
Galor‘s claims are based on distorted presentations of data and generally on 
repeatedly violating the fundamental principles of scientific investigation. They are 
based on impressions rather than on the rigorous scientific analysis of empirical 
evidence. 
Galor claims that the ―unified growth theory sheds light on the perplexing 
phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita across regions of the 
world in the past two centuries‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 177). If it does, then his theory is 
a fiction because the perplexing phenomenon of the great divergence never 
happened. 
Why did we devote so much time on the discussion of Galor‘s Unified Growth 
Theory (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 
2015h)? The answer is simple. As for Isaak Newton, the aim of any scientific 
investigation is to discover the truth. It is not a person dislike. Science looks for 
correct interpretations but Galor‘s theory is so obviously incorrect that it attracted 
immediate attention.  
However, there is also another important reason: Galor‘s Unified Growth 
Theory is not only incorrect but also dangerously incorrect because it diverts 
attention from the urgent need to monitor, control and regulate the current 
economic growth. It would be unwise to accept his theory and his explanations 
because his incorrect explanations of the historical economic growth are linked 
strongly with the current economic growth, which affects our future. 
Galor claims that after a long epoch of stagnation we are now in the regime of 
sustained economic growth. His theory also strongly suggests that the current 
economic growth is not only sustained but also sustainable because in general it 
follows slowly-increasing trajectories (see Figure 3). The future appears to be safe 
and secure.  
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However, precisely the same data, which he used during the formulation of his 
theory, show that the opposite is true. It was in the past that the economic growth 
was safe and secure but now it follows strongly hazardous trajectories. Recent 
analysis of the world economic growth also indicates that its future is insecure 
(Nielsen, 2015b), which is hardly surprising because our current combined 
ecological footprint is already significantly higher than the ecological capacity 
(WWF, 2010). 
Why did Galor manipulate data? Why did he repeatedly present distorted 
diagrams to support his preconceived ideas? Why did he quote isolated and well-
chosen but otherwise meaningless numbers to support his arguments? Why did he 
create such an elaborate work of fiction? 
If we assume that he did not do it all on purpose, then a possible explanation is 
that he did not know how to analyse data. However, this explanation is 
unconvincing because he appears to be familiar with mathematics. Anyone familiar 
with mathematics can see quickly that plots of Maddion‘s data display 
characteristic features of hyperbolic distribution. Anyone familiar with 
mathematics knows also that the analysis of hyperbolic distributions is trivially 
simple (Nielsen, 2014). However, equally surprising is why his publications 
escaped the scrutiny of the peer-review system. 
The most plausible explanation is probably that he was blinded by prejudice. It 
is what psychologists describe as the cascade behaviour, information cascade, 
informational avalanche, illusion of truth, illusory truth, illusion of familiarity, 
running with the pack, following the crowd, herding behaviour, bandwagons and 
path depending choice (Anderson & Holt, 1997; Begg, Anas & Farinacci, 1992; 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992; De Vany & Lee, 2008; De Vany & 
Walls, 1999; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Grebe, Schmid & Stiehler, 2008; Ondrias, 
1999; Parks & Tooth, 2006; Ramsey, Raafat, Chater & Frith, 2009; Walden & 
Browne, 2003). It is the fear of being different, of taking risks, of sticking the neck 
out, of claiming something, which is not commonly accepted. 
In certain areas of intellectual activities, this problem creates nearly 
insurmountable obstacles. In the demographic and economic research this 
phenomenon is demonstrated by the reluctance to accept the compelling 
contradicting evidence simply because many demographers or economists would 
not agree with the contradicting evidence. It is safer to follow the crowd and run 
with the pack. Tradition is stronger than science and only an outsider who has not 
been blinded by prejudice and who is not afraid of being rejected by the crowd 
might dare to show that the accepted doctrines are incorrect. He or she is then 
risking to be ridiculed and rejected but science is a self-correcting discipline so 
sooner or later such resistance to accept the overwhelming empirical evidence will 
have to be overcome, but it would be better for science and scientists if the required 
change in the paradigm is accepted sooner rather than later. 
We now have a large body of data (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; 
Durand, 1967, 1974, 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; 
Maddison, 2001, 2010; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 
1994), which can be usedto improve our understanding of the economic growth 
and of the growth of human population. Correct understanding of these two 
processes might have essential impact on our future. 
The recent mathematical analysis of data (Nielsen, 2014; 2015a; 2016a; 2016b; 
2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2015h) reveals many interesting features, 
which call for further investigation. The past economic growth and the growth of 
human population were hyperbolic. Within the range of analysable data, which for 
the growth of human population extends down to 10,000 BC, there was no 
Malthusian stagnation. Hyperbolic growth was slow but remarkably steady. There 
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were no transitions from stagnation to growth because there was no stagnation. 
There was no escape from the Malthusian trap in the economic growth or in the 
growth of population because there was no trap. There were no takeoffs from 
stagnation to growth claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011). There was no differential 
timing of takeoffs, claimed also by Galor, because there were no takeoffs.  
We have demonstrated (Nielsen, 2016h) that there was no ―sudden spurt in 
growth rates of output per capita‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 220). Contrary to the similar 
claim made by Galor, there was also no sudden spurt in the growth rate of human 
population in the past 12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016b). The ―unresolved mysteries 
about the growth process‖ listed by Galor (2005a, p. 220) have now been solved. 
They do not exist.  They are phantom mysteries created by Galor through the 
manipulation of data. 
Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the trajectories of economic 
growth and of the growth of population. There was no population explosion. What 
is perceived as takeoffs or explosions are just the natural continuations of 
hyperbolic growth (Nielsen, 2014). There was also no ―mind-boggling‖ and 
―perplexing phenomenon of the Great Divergence in income per capita across 
regions of the world in the past two centuries‖ (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220).  
Recently, economic growth and the growth of human population started to be 
diverted to slower trajectories but these new trajectories continue to increase close 
to the historical hyperbolic trajectories. Analysis of data shows that not only the 
Unified Growth Theory but also the Demographic Transition Theory, which is 
based on similar assumptions, is repeatedly contradicted by empirical evidence 
(Nielsen, 2016c).  
All these features suggest new lines of investigation aimed at answering many 
important question about economic growth and about the growth of human 
population. Why the economic growth and the growth of human population were 
hyperbolic. Why the hyperbolic growth was so remarkably stable over such a long 
time in the past. Why was it not affected by many random forces that were no 
doubt present? Why the economic growth and population growth trajectories were 
not affected by the Industrial Revolution. The only exception where there is a 
correlation between the Industrial Revolution and the economic growth and the 
growth of population is Africa, the poorest region. This boosting can be explained 
by the colonisation of Africa rather than by the beneficial effects of the Industrial 
Revolution. What models should be used to explain the historical hyperbolic 
economic growth and the growth of human population? What are the common 
features that link these two processes? Why was the economic growth and the 
growth of human population diverted relatively recently to new, non-hyperbolic 
trajectories? Are these new trajectories likely to change again into the apparently 
preferred hyperbolic growth? How to prevent such an undesirable event? What 
should be done to make the growth of population and economic growth 
sustainable? Much work needs to be done but it would unwise and potentially 
dangerous to be guided by the Unified Growth Theory. 
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